PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR SEPTEMBER.

When a bicyclist comes up behind a pedestrian, who is
unconscious of his approach, and is walking on a path beside
a highway, without giving any warning of his
Bicycles,
approach, and strikes the pedestrian with his
Injury to
Pedestrian,
Negligence,
Evidence

bicycle, the burden rests on the bicyclist to show
that he was free from negligence, in order to

relieve himself from liability: Myers v. Hinds, (Supreme Court
of Michigan,) 68 N. W. Rep. 156.
Under the second section of Article 3 of the Constitution
of the United.7States, which provides that the judicial power of
the United States shall extend to all cases affectConflict of
ing ambassadors, other public ministers, and conLaws,
Courts,
suls a state court has no jurisdiction in a civil case
Jurisdiction,
State and
Federal,

consul of
Foreign
Nation

y

over the person of a consul of a foreign government resident in the state, irrespective of the repeal
of the judiciary act of 1789: Wilcox v. Luco,.

(Supreme Court of California,) 45 Pac. Rep. 676.
To the same effect are Davis v. Packard,7 Pet. 276, 1833;
Miller v. Van Loben Seis, 66 Cal. 341 ; S.C., 5 Pac. Rep. 5 12,
1885.
The Laws of New York of 1896, c. 427, § I, created a.
board of four police commissioners for the city of Albany, to be
Constitutional elected by the common council, and provided that
Law,
not more than two of them should belong to the
Election of
same political party; that for the purpose of such
Officers,
Appointment, election, the members of the council attending the
Minority
Representation

meeting should constitute a quorum; that each
member of the council should be entitled to vote for not more
than two commissioners; that if a vacancy should occur in
the board of police commissioners, it should be filled by
appointment by the mayor, on the written recommendation of
642
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a majority of the members of the common council belonging
to the same political party as the commissioner whose office
should become vacant; and that no person should be eligible
to the office of police commissioner unless he was a member of
the political party having the highest or next highest representation in the common council. In Rathbone v. Wirtl. 40
N. Y. Suppl. 535, this statute was held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court of New York, (Appellate Division, Third
Department,) on the ground that it infringed the rights of the
majority to govern by giving the minority equal power with
the majority in the selection of police commissioners; that
the pow'rer of the legislature to determine the method of filling
a newly-created office does not go to the extent of permitting
it to prescribe a method by which the right of the majority of
the electors to select the officer may be defeated; and that
the act could not be sustained on the ground that it secured
minority representation, since it put the minority on an
equality with the majority. .Landon,J., dissented.
In State v. Thwrson, 68 N. W. Rep. 202, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota has recently decided, (i) That under
Laws S. Dak. 1891, c. 57, § 12, which provides
Submission
of Question to that "Whenever any proposed constitution or
Voters,
constitutional amendment or other question is to
injunction
be submitted to the people of the state for popular
vote, the secretary of state shall . . . . certify the same to the
auditor of each county in the state," it is the duty of the secretary to certify a question directed by the legislature as to
whether a provision of the constitution shall be repealed,
though an affirmative answer by the people would not affect
the constitution, and the submission is therefore practically
useless; (2) That an injunction to enjoin the submission of a
constitutional amendment to the vote of the people because
the submission is invalid will not lie merely at the instance of a
taxpayer and elector, since the taxpayer will receive no
substantial injury from such submission; and (3) That the
courts have no jurisdiction to prevent the submission to the
people, as directed by the legislature, of a question involving
an amendment to the constitution, by enjoining the secretary
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of state from certifying the question to the county auditors, as
such action would be an unwarranted interference with the
authority of the legislature.
A debt arising on a contract for the purchase of goods,
entered into in November, 1891, but under which there is no
Corporations, delivery until October, 1892, is not, prior to such
Failure to File delivery, an existing debt, within the meaning of a
Annual
Statement,
statute (Pub. Stat. R. I. c. 155, §§ II, 12,) proLiability of viding that upon the failure of a manufacturing
Stockholder,mauctrn
corporation to-file a statement of its conc:tion on
or before a certain day in each year the stockholder shall be
liable for any debt of the corporation then existing, for this
liability not being contractual, but purely statutory, and in
derogation of the common law, the statute must be strictly
pursued: Wing v. Slater, (Supreme Court of Rhode Island,)
35 Atl. Rep. 302.
A bookkeeper of a corporation, who has no pecuniary
interest therein, though elected to a vacancy in the board of
directors, and made a nominal holder of stock for
Insolvency,
Preferred
that purpose, is entitled to preference on the insolClaims
vency of the corporation, under Act
N. J. 1892,
P. L. 426, which provides that "the laborers and workmen,
and all persons doing labor or service of whatever character
in the regular employ of such corporation, shall have a first
and prior lien :" Consolidated Coal Co. v. Keystone Chemical Co.,
(Court of Chancery of N. J., Pitney, V. C.,) 35 Atl. Rep. 157.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Alabama, authority to an agent to vote at a corporate meeting
upon the stock of his principal does not empower
Meetings,
Voting,
the agent to act for his principal in connection
Principal and with the other stockholders, who were also crediExisting Debt

Agent,
Powers of
Agent

- tors

of the corporation, in regard to the cancellation
of a mortgage of the corporation, given to secure

claims of the principal and those stockholders against the
corporation: Moore v. Ensley, 20 So. Rep. 744.
It is not ultra vires for a manufacturing corporation to pur-
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,chase a large tract of land for the purpose of erecting thereon
Ultra Vires, its factories and residences for its employes, and
Providing
to contribute toward the establishment there of a
Residences,
etc.,
for Employes

church, a school, a free library, and a free bath
for its employes: Steinway v. Steinway & Sons,

(Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, New York
County,) 4o N. Y. SuppI. 718.
After a jury has been impaneled and sworn in a criminal
case, the trial cannot stop short of a verdict without the con'Criminal Law, sent of the defendant, except for imperative reaT'*,
Ve In
sons, such as the illness of a juror, the judge, or
Jeopardy,
Withdrawal
of Case from

the defendant, the absence of a juror, or a dis-

Jury,

agreement, and, therefore, when a case, after the
trial has commenced, is withdrawn from the jury
on account of the absence of a witness for the state, the
defendant has been'onceiplaced in jeopardy, and may plead it
in bar of another trial, unless he consents thereto; and such
,consent is not established by the mere fact that a defendant
without counsel does not object to the withdrawal of the case
from the jury, and the postponement of the trial, nor will
that fact constitute a waiver of his right to plead the with,drawal in bar of another trial for the same offence: State v.
Richardson, (Supreme Court of South Carolina,) 25 S. E.
Rep. 220.
Consent

The principles on which the enforcement of building restrictions contained in a deed depend, have recently been thoroughly examined and defined by Vice Chancellor
Deed,
Building
Emery, of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey,
.Restrictions,
waiver,

raches

in Trout v. Lucas, 35 AUt. Rep. 153. He holds
(i) That when a tract of land is laid out by the

owner into lots and blocks f6r sale, in accordance with a
general scheme, by which restrictions as to building are
imposed on each purchaser, for the benefit of all the land, and
these restrictions are embodied in the conveyances, the right
,of one lot owner to enforce the covenant against another is
not a legal, but a purely equitable one; and being such, the
restrictions will only be enforced when it would be equitable
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to do so; and (2) That a court of equity will not require the
removal of a building, on the ground that it is in violation of'
a covenant in the deed of the owner, when his grantor and
the owners of other lots permitted its erection without objection; and subsequent purchasers are bound by the acquiescence or laches of their grantors.
In the case in hand, the deeds to lots in a tract of land
contained covenants that the grantees should not build thereon
nearer than twenty-five feet to certain streets; but a purchaser
erected a building less than twenty-two feet distant from the
street, and six years later added a tower to the building,
extending to within about eleven feet of the street. No
objection was made by the grantor or other owners when the
building and tower were erected. The complainant, who
bought his lots at about the same time that the tower was
erected, and made no objection to the encroachment at the
time, brought suit about three years later for a mandatory
injunction to remove so much of the building as stood within.
twenty-five feet of the street; but this was refused.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, a
general deposit of public funds by a public officer subject to
check, is not a "loan " within the statutory and
Deposit of
Public
constitutional prohibition against the loaning of
Funds,
Loan

public funds, with or without interest: Allibone
v. Ames, 68 N. W. Rep. 165.
According to a recent decision of the Queen's Bench
Division, the rule that delivery of a chattel is essential to constitute a valid donatio causa morlis is satisfied by
Donatio
Causa Mortis, an antecedent delivery of the chattel to the donee,.
Delivery
though alio intuitu : Cain v. Moon, [1896] 2 Q..
B. 283.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has lately held that presidential electors are state officers, within the meaning of a constiElections,

tutional provision, (Const. Ky. §

152,) which

Appointment,
Vacancies,

provides that if the unexpired term of an elective

Presidential
Electors

election at which either city or state officers, etc.,

State Officers, officer does not end at the next succeeding annual
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are elected, and three months intervene before such election,.
the office shall be filled by appointment until said election, and
then said vacancy shall be filled by election : Todd v. Johnson,.
36 S. W. Rep. 987.
In answer to a communication from the Governor, theSupreme Court of Rhode Island has declared that under the
Qualifications Constitution of Rhode Island, Art. 2, § i, which
of Voters,
provides that an elector who is to be qualified to
Ownersbip of

Rea Estate

vote by reason of ownership of real estate shall
be " one who is really and truly possessed in his own right
of real estate,... .being an estate in fee simple, fee tail, for
the life of any person, or an estate in reversion or remainder
which qualifies no other person to vote," the owner of an
equitable estate in land is not a qualified elector: In re
Qualifications of Electors, 35 Atl. Rep. 213.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut, McAdam v. CentralRy. & Electric Co., 35 Atl.
Rep. 341, the defendant, an electric street railway
Electric
Railways,
and light company, had constructed its railway in
Negligence,

Master and

Servant

such a manner that the support and span wires,
which passed over the trolley wire, might become

dangerous by contact with the latter, unless properly insulated.
The plaintiff, a lineman of the company, received an electric
shock on taking hold of a support wire, due to the fact that
a span wire, which was not insulated, had come in contact
with the trolley wire, and was thrown to the ground and
injured. In an action by him to recover damages, it was held
that a finding that the company was guilty of- negligence rendering it liable for the injuries received by the plaintiff was
proper.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan, an
assignment by an executor appointed by the proEquitable
Assignment, bate court, who has secured the probate of the
Compensation will, of compensation to be earned in defending
of Executor
against an appeal, is void as against
public policy:
In re King's Estate, 68 N. W. Rep. 154.
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In Norton v. Dashwood, [1896] 2 Ch. 497, Justice Chitty,
of the Chancery Division, has lately held, that tapestry which
had been cut and pieced so as to cover the walls
Fixtures,
of a. room and the space left by the doors. and
Tapestry,
mantelpiece, and was hung by being nailed to
Devise
wooden buttons let into the plaster and nailed to the brickwork, passed as a fixture under a devise of the mansion-house.
This decision was based upon D'Eyncourtv. Gregory, 3 L. R.
Eq. 382, 1866, where a testator, who was tenant for life of
settled estates, on which he had erected, fitted up, and furnished a mansion-house, (an old one having fallen into decay,)
bequeathed all the tapestry, marbles, statues, pictures with their
frames and glasses, which should be in or about the house at
the time of his death, and of which he had power to dispose,
to be enjoyed as heir-looms by the person who, under the
limitations in his will, would be entitled to his own estates
thereby devised in strict settlement, being the same as those
entitled to the settled estates, subject to a condition, with a
shifting clause in case the condition was not fulfilled. After
the testator's death, A. became tenant for life of both the
settled and devised estates, and on his death the settled estates
devolved on B.; but, as the condition was not fulfilled, C.
became entitled to the devised estate, and to the heir-looms
under the shifting clause in the testator's will. The question
arose, as between B. and C., which of the articles passed under
the will; and it was held, that tapestry, pictures in frames,
frames filled with satin, and attached to the walls, and also
statues, figures, vases and stone garden-seats, purchased and
set in place by the testator, which were essentially part of the
house, or of the architectural design of the building or grounds,
however fastened, were fixtures, and could not be removed;
but that glasses and pictures not in panels, not being part of
the building, and articles purchased by the testator, but fixed
in place by A. after his death, were not fixtures, and passed to
C., under the will.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, abandoning the views
expressed in People v.. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325 ; . C:, 39 N;W.
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Game Laws,
Prohibition of
Sale or
Possession,

Constitutionality
of Laws
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Rep. i, holds now that an act (Laws Mich.
1893, No. 196, § 5,) which prohibits the sale or
possession for the purpose of sale of any kind
of bird, game, or fish, at any time when the
taking, catching, or killing thereof is prohibited

by law, and another (Laws Mich. 1895, No. 223,) prohibiting
the sale of quail at any time, apply to the sale or possession of
game killed out of the state, and are not unconstitutional, as
interfering with interstate commerce, but are a valid exercise
of the police power of the state: Peole v. O'Neil, 68 N. W.
Rep. 227.
This view has unfortunately been adopted by the weight of
authority: Whitehead v. Smithers, 2 C. P. D. 553, 1877;
Ex p. Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 1894; Magner v. People, 97 Ill.
320, 1881; State v. Randolpz, i Mo. App. 15, 1876; Statev.
Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 1894; N. Y Assn. for Protection oj
Game v. Durham, 51 N. Y. Super. Ct. 306, 1885; Roth v.
State, 51 Ohio St. 209, 1894, affirming 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 62,
1893; and has been applied to the keeping of game in cold
storage: State v. Judy, 7 Mo. App. 524, 1879; and to the
catching of trout artificially propagated: Comm. v. Gilbert,
I6o Mass. 157, 1893; though how it can be held that a statute which forbids the bare possession of such game is constitutional, passes any ordinary mind to discover. When the
prohibition is of possession for the purpose of sale, as in the
principal case, such an act is of course constitutional; and it
will not be construed to apply to imported game sold in the
original package: Exp. Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 1894.
The minority doctrine, that such a statute cannot be
intended to apply to imported game, since its object is the
preservation of game within the limits of its own authority, is
more conducive to justice and more consonant with sound
reason ; especially in view of the fact that the close seasons
differ in different states, so that the killing may be lawful:
Comm. v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410, I 88o; Comm. v. Wilkinson,
139 Pa. 298, S. C., 27 W. N. C. I6o, 21 Atl. Rep. 14,
1891; see Allen v. Young, 76 Me. 8o, 1883.
But this,
though once upheld by it: People v. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325,

.65o
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S. C., 39 N. W. Rep. 1, 1888, the Supreme Court of Michigan, for some reason, has seen fit to abandon.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of California, the
defendant, who was an officer of a corporation and a large
Guaranty, stockholder therein, with the intent of relieving
the demands of other creditors, urged the plaintiff
Collateral
Undertaking,

Statute of
Frauds

to invest P ,500 in the stock of the corporation,

and verbally agreed with him that he should buy

the stock and pay the price thereof to the company, and that
in the event of the stock becoming worthless, he, (the defendant,) would repay to the plaintiff the price paid for the stock.
This was held to be an original contract, and therefore not
within the statute of frauds: Ki/bride v. Moss, 45 Pac. Rep. 812.
When several persons attack another, intending merely to
frighten and beat him, and not to do him any severe bodily
harm, but the person so. assailed has reasonable
Homicide,
ground to believe, from the nature of the attack
Excusable
-and the surrounding circumstances, that there is a design to
kill him, and so believing shoots and kills one of his assailants,
the homicide is justifiable: State v. Lima, (Supreme Court of
Louisiana,) 20 So. Rep. 737.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
.South Carolina, when the body of a murdered man was burned
and mutilated beyond recognition, testimony that
Homicide,
-Corpus Delicti a piece of charred cloth, found among the ashes with

the deceased, was like the cloth of which the trousers he wore at
the time of his disappearance were made, and that a slate pencil
found there was identical with one carried by the deceased, and
known to be such by a certain indentation on the side, was
competent evidence to establish the identity of the body, its
sufficiency being for the jury: Stae v.Martin, 25 S. E. Rep. 113.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has again scotched the
.schemes of the sporting fraternity to evade the provisions of
Horse
Racing,
Evasion of
Statute

the Roby Race-Track Law of March 5, 1895, P.
L. 92, which provided (§ I) that there shall be

no horse-racing from November 15th to April 15th
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-in every year; (§ 2) that "it shall be unlawful for any person,
- corporation, company or association to hold or advertise for a
race meeting oftener than three times in any year, and no
race meeting shall be held longer than fifteen days. It shall
be unlawful to hold any race meeting oftener than twice in
any period of sixty days, and it shall also be unlawful
to hold any race meeting until after the full period of
thirty days has elapsed after a meeting has been held; "
prescribes penalties for the violation of its provisions, and
gives a remedy by injunction against threatened violations of the act (§ 4.) The first attempt to evade this
statute was by organizing three several companies or associations to hold race meetings alternately upon the same track,
so that they might each hold a race meeting on the Roby
race track for the statutory period of fifteen days, and in such
order that, when each association came to hold its second and
every subsequent race meeting, there would be a space of
thirty full days between each of its meetings, and thus make
the race meeting continuous from the i5th of April to the
15th of November of each year. Action was brought against
those interested in the association to recover the statutory
penalty; and the lower court held the evasion legal, and sustained a demurrer to the complaint. This judgment was
reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that it made no
difference whether the second or other subsequent meeting
held within the thirty days was held by the same party that
held the former meeting or by a different party, company or
association, and construed the statute to forbid a race meeting
to be held for a longer period than fifteen days at one time
and less than thirty days subsequent to the last race meeting held at the same place, regardless of the person,
company or association holding either of such meetings:
State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168, S. C., 41 N. E. Rep. 145,

1895.

That decision "seems to have been cheerfully acqui-

esced in by the people attempting to carry on race meetings
in Lake county. But a striking coincidence occurs. No
sooner was the former decision finally confirmed, than arrangements were set on foot, not only to continue the race business
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at Roby, but arrangements were made to construct two other
race tracks as close to Roby as they could conveniently bemade." These tracks were constructed, one separated from
Roby by a highway only, and the other less than half a mileaway. The state, through the attorney general, brought suit
for an injunction under the act against the owners of the
three tracks. The evidence of the defendants, the proprietors.
of these tracks, showed that horse racing was profitable only
when horses could be kept together for a long period; that.
the arrangement between the proprietors of the three tracks.
was that Roby should open and run for fifteen days, then
Forsythe for the next fifteen days, and then Sheffield for the next.
fifteen days, thus leaving a period of thirty days since Roby
closed, and that then the merry-go-round should begin again;.
that only one track should be open during the fifteen days
that another was running; that the same judge acted at all
the tracks, the same horses were entered, and at the end of the
fifteen days the meeting was simply transferred from one track.
to another; and that the horses remained located in the
various barns in which they were quartered without regard to
the particular track on which they might be racing. Yet thesame judge refused the temporary injunction prayed for and
on the final hearing found for the defendants, and refused amotion for a new trial made by the plaintiff. This judgment
was of course reversed, the Supreme Court holding that the
three successive meetings, though held on separate tracks
owned and controlled by separate companies or associations,.
under the evidence constituted but one race meeting, and were
within the prohibition bf the statute; and that the finding of
the trial court that the races conducted at each track constituted a separate and distinct race meeting, was in effect a conclusion of law, and not of fact, and was therefore open toreview and correction on appeal: State v. Forsythe, 44 N. E.
Rep. 593.

A policy which insures against loss or damage to property,.
whether owned by the insured or others, for which the insured,
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may be liable, resulting from the explosion of a
Insurance,
steam boiler, and also against loss of life or injury
Nature of
to persons, whether employes of the insured
Contract
or strangers, caused by such explosion, payable to
the insured for the benefit of such persons or their legal representatives, is a contract of indemnity, and a person injured by
such an explosion cannot sue the insurance company: Embler
v. HarfordSteam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., (Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department,)
4o N. Y. Suppl. 450.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently decided a
very interesting question of marine insurance, on appeal from
Boiler

a decision of Gorell Barnes, J., (The Copernicus,
[1896] P. 154). By a policy on freight, "at and
from any port or ports of loading on the west
coast of South America to any port or ports of
discharge in the United Kingdom," the freight
was to be covered "from the time of the
engagement of the goods." Goods were engaged for the vessel
which was to carry the freight, and were ready for shipment
in her at the time of her loss, which occurred before she
arrived at her first loading port on the west coast of South
America. The owners of the vessel sued for the insurance on
the freight, but judgment was given for the defendant; and
this was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that
the "engagement" clause must be construed with reference to
the voyage described in the policy, and that, therefore, as the
vessel had not arrived at her first loading port on the west
coast of South America, the risk had not attached: The
Copernicus, [1896] P. 237.
Marine
Insurance,
Freight,
Commence.
ment of Risk,
Engagement
of Goods,
Loading Port

In the opinion of the Supreme Court -of Georgia, a bona
fide "loan" of a pint of whisky by one person to another,
without any criminal intent, the borrower agreeing
Intoxicating
Liquors,
to return to the "lender" another pint of the same
Sale
kind of whisky, which he in fact does, is not
a sale
of the whisky within the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, though the whisky "lent" was intended to be
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and was consumed by the borrower: Skinner v. State, 25 S. E.
Rep. 364.

-A statement by a juror to his fellow jurors, that he was a
member of a grand jury which indicted the defendJury,
ant for another crime, which he described, will
'Misconduct
-vitiate the verdict: Ryan v. State, (Supreme Court of Tennessee,) 36 S. W. Rep. 930.
In Thomas v. Bozven, 45 Pac. Rep. 768, the Supreme Court
of Oregon lately ruled that the following newspaper item. was
libelous per se :
"Charged with Larceny.
Libel
"Mrs. Flora Thomas, colored, in the Toils.
"The arrest of Mrs. Flora Thomas, a colored domestic in
the employ of Fannie Hall, the brothel keeper, took place
yesterday by constable Snow, on a warrant charging her with
larceny from a dwelling. The woman has only been in the
employ of Fannie Hall a short time, but long enough, it seems,
for her to ply her kleptomaniac tendencies to their full measure.
Numerous articles were missed from the house at various times,
until finally her apartments in a house on an adjoining block
were searched, and the stolen property found. The woman
was taken before Justice Bentley, who allowed the woman to
go on her own recognizance until her preliminary examination
was called to-day."

According to a recent decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, a local telegraph operator at a
station on the line of a railroad, who receives and
Master and

Servant,

delivers the orders of a train dispatcher in respect

of the movement of trains, is the fellow-servant of
the employes of the railroad company in charge
of the trains; and such employes, if injured in consequence of
his negligence, cannot recover damages from the railroad company: Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co. v. Frost, 74 Fed.
Rep. 965. Hawley, D. J., dissented, with much reason. The
operator in this case did not have a single badge of the relaFellowServant
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tion of fellow-servant, except that he was apparently in the
employ of the company.
The Supreme Court of Ohio holds, that when bonds secured
by one and the same mortgage on corporate property are issued
at different times, the liens of all the bonds outMortgage
Bonds,
standing in the hands of bona fide purchasers for
Lien,
value are equal in priority, since the lien of each
Priority
bond dates from the record of the mortgage that
•secured it, and not from the time it was issued: Pittsburgh,
C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lynde, 44 N. E. Rep. 596.
The following decision may prove of interest to stamp-collectors. The statute of 47 & 48 Vict. c. 76, § 7, provides
Post Offie, that "a person shall not (a) make, knowingly
Stamps,
utter, deal in or sell any fictitious stamp, or knowDie for
Making Fici.-

ingly use for any postal purpose any fictitious

tious Stamp, stamp, or (b) have in his possession, unless he
Possession,
Liabiity

shews a lawful excuse, any fictitious stamp, or (c)
make, or, unless he shews a lawful excuse, have in his possession, any die, plate, instrument, or materials for making any
fictitious stamp," prescribes a penalty for violation of its provisions, and declares that "for the purpose of this section
"fictitious stamp' means any facsimile or imitation or representation, whether on paper or otherwise, of any stamp for
denoting any rate of postage, including any stamp for denoting a rate of postage of any of her Majesty's colonies, or of
any foreign country." The proprietor of a newspaper that
circulated among stamp-collectors and others caused a die to
be made for him abroad, from which imitations or repr~sentalions of a current colonial postage-stamp could be produced.
The only purpose for which he ordered the die, and kept it in
his possession, was in order to make upon the pages of an
illustrated stamp catalogue or newspaper, called "The Philatelist's Supplement," illustrations of the colonial stamp in
black and white only, and not in colors, this special supplement being intended for sale as part of his newspaper. He
,was informed against under the statute; and the magistrate

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

stated the case for the opinion of the Queen's Bench Division,
which held that the possession of a die for making a false
stamp, known to its possessor to be such, was, however innocent the use that he intended to make of it, a possession without lawful excuse within the meaning of the act: Dickins v.
Gill, (Queen's Bench Division,) [1896] 2 Q. B. 370.
This decision seems hardly consonant with sound reason.
If the fact that he intended to use the die for the purpose
stated, and no other, was not a lawful excuse, one wonders
what could be; and further, the whole tone of the statute
seems to be that only those stamps and dies are within its
purview which are intended for unlawful use in paying postage on mail matter.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has added itself to the
list of those that hold that since the duty of a public officer or
board entrusted with the letting of public contracts
Public
to the lowest responsible bidder is not merely a
Contracts,
Award,
ministerial one, but involves the exercise of disLowest
Responsible cretion, their judgment'in awarding such contracts
Bidder,
cannot be controlled by mandamus; and also
Mandamus
holds, as a matter of course, that since the issue of a peremptory mandamus in such a case is erroneous, a commitment
for a refusal to comply therewith is a nullity: In re Mc Cain,
68 N. W. Rep. 163.
See, on this subject, 33 Am. L. REG. N. S. 899; 34 AM.
L. REG. N. S. 71.

According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, City of Louisville v. Wilson, 36 S. W. Rep. 944,
the members of the boards of.public safety and
Pullic
Officers,
public works, the secretaries of the boards, the
Salaries,
assistant bailiff of the police court, and the stenogReduction,
Constitutional
rapher of the city court, are " officers " within the
Law
meaning of the constitutional provision that the salaries of
public officers shall be neither increased nor diminished during
their term of office ; and an ordinance reducing the salaries of
those officers, during their term of office, is therefore unconstitutional and void; but a statute providing, that the salary of
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an officer shall be "not less than" a certain sum does not fix
it at that sum, and therefore an ordinance passed after their
appointment, fixing their salaries at a higher figure than those
sums, is not unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has recently decided, that
though a city charter requires contracts to be
Public
Contracts,
Rights of
Lowest
Bidder,
Action for
Profits

let to the lowest bidder, the lowest bidder
under a proposed contract, whose bid has been
rejected, has no right of action against the city
to recover the profits which might have been made

had hit bid been accepted: Talbot Pay. Co. v. City of Detroit,
67 N. W. Rep. 979In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Michigan,
Tobias v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 68 N. W. Rep. 234, where the
plaintiff's intestate was injured in an accident at a
Railroads,
crossings,
Electric Bell,
Negligence,

Contributory
Negligence

railroad crossing, the evidence showed that the
company maintained an electric bell at the cross-

ing, which was rung automatically by passing

trains, but was often out of order and did not ring

properly, and was in that condition when the plaintiff's intestate was injured. It also appeared that a train approaching
the crossing could be seen for a long distance. The trial
judge instructed the jury that if there had been no bell it
would not have been prudent to cross the track without first
looking; that the presence of the bell did not release the
deceased from the duty of exercising due care; that the
question was how far the deceased, as a prudent man, was
eutitled to rely on the bell; and that, if he had looked, he
,could have seen the coming train. It was held, in error, that
these instructions properly presented the issues.
A railroad ticket entitling a designated person to a stated
number of single continuous trips, for each of which a separate coupon is attached, "between" two specified
Tickets,
Coupons,
Constructlon

stations, which stipulates that "passage shall be

taken only on such trains as stop at the above-

named stations," and also that "this ticket shall be good only
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for continuous trips between" those stations, confers on the
holder of the ticket the right, upon surrendering one of the
coupons, to ride from an intermediate station to either of
the two stations mentioned in the ticket, or from either of
those stations to the intermediate station, provided he boards
a passenger train that, upon its regular schedule, stops at the.
intermediate station as well as the two specified stations:
Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v. Clarke, (Supreme Court of
Georgia,) 25 S. E. Rep. 368.'
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in a very able and exhaustive opinion, (but regrettably marred by an unnecessary flippancy of tone in some paragraphs,) has torn itself
Railroad
loose from the trammels of authority, which would'
Mortgages,
Claims for
Tort,

Priority

postpone a claimant for damages for a tort to the
lien of mortgage bondholders of a corporation,

and adopted a doctrine which seems thoroughly in accord
with the principles of justice. It holds that when judgment on
a claim against the mortgagor for a tort has been obtained
before the mortgage is foreclosed or a receiver appointed, the
damages so reduced to judgment should be regarded as
operating expenses charged by the judgment upon income as
against the mortgages and all their incidents, and should take
precedence of such claims in a decree for the distribution of
income: Green v. Coast Line R. R. Co., 24 S.E. Rep. 814.
In Michigan, a by-law of a savings bank, organized under the
general banking laws, and required by statute to have capital
Savings
Banks,
By-Laws,
Payment of
Deposit

stock and stockholders, which provides that the

bank shall not be liable to a depositor for payment,
of the moneys deposited to the holder of his pals
book, though it should be stolen from the dep6si-

tor, is not binding on the depositor, unless he has notice
thereof; since, under the laws of that state, the officers of the
bank, who make the by-laws, are agents of the bank and not
of the depositor, and Pub. L. Mich. 1887, p. 233, requires
that deposits shall be paid to the depositor or his personal
representatives: .Ackenlzausen v. People's Savings Bank,
(Supreme Court of Michigan,) 68 N. W. Rep. i18.
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In states where a savings bank is managed by trustees for
the benefit of the depositors, a different rule prevails : Sullivan v. Institution, 56 Me. 507, 1869 ; Goldrich v. Bank, 123
Mass. 320, 1877; Schoenwald v. Bank, 57 N. Y. 418, 1874;
Ap.pleby v. Bank, 62 N. Y. 12, 1875.
Equitable set-off cannot be pleaded by way of answer, but
the relief sought must be invoked by bill or
Set-off,
Equitable,
cross-bill: American Natl. Bk. v. Nashville WarePleading
hoise & Elevator Co., (Court of Chancery Appeals
of Tennessee,) 36 S. W. Rep. 9 o.
In a recent case in the Queen's Bench Division, tried before
Mathew, J., without a jury, the plaintiffs shipped goods which
were contraband of war -on the defendants' ship for
Shipping,
Bill of Lading, carriage from London to Yokohama, under a bill
Excepted
Perils,

Restaintof
Contraband
of War,
Risk

of Seizure,
Part

Performance
of Contract of
Carriage,
Refusal to
Complete,
Discharge at

of lading containing the exception of "restraint of
princes," and also a special clause "that if the
entering of or discharging in the port (of discharge) shall be considered by the master unsafe
by reason of war ..
the master may land the
goods at the nearest safe and convenient port."
The ship also carried goods belonging to other
shippers. In the course of her voyage the ship
arrived at Hong Kong, and on the day of her

'Intermediate arrival there, war was declared between China
Port,
Justification

and Japan. There were, at the time, several Chinese war vessels in and around the port of Hong Kong, and
if the master had attempted to sail thence with the plaintiff's
goods on board, there would have been a serious danger
of their seizure and confiscation. The master, accordingly,
landed them there. The plaintiffs brought an action for
breach of contract to carry the goods to Yokohama. But the
court held, (I) that risk of seizure of the goods, if it was
attempted to carry them further, amounted to a " restraint of
princes," within the exception; (2) that such risk of seizure,
on the voyage between Hong Kong and Yokohama, rendered the entering of or discharging in the port of Yokohama
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unsafe within the meaning of the special clause; and (3) that
the master's duty to take care of the cargo justified him, apart
from any exceptions in the bill of lading, in landing the plaintiff's goods where he did: Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jenkins &
Co., [1896] 2 Q. B. 326.
A sleeping-car company, though not a common carrier,
owes its passengers certain general duties, arising from the
Sleeping-car contracts which it makes with them, and involving
the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care and
Companies,
Duty to
attention towards, them, and a violation of these
Passengers,
duties may be made the subject of an action
Liability
either ex contractu or ex deliclo; and in an action against a
sleeping-car company for failure to discharge its duty to provide a properly-warmed and comfortable car for its passengers, it cannot be said, on demurrer, that damages alleged
to have been caused by such failure, consisting in suffering
from the low temperature, and the contracting a violent cold,
which resulted in permanent injury to the eyes, are so remote
as not to be recoverable: Hughes v. Pullman Palace Car Co.,
(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri, N. D.) 74 Fed. Rep. 499.
In a recent case before North, J., of the Chancery Division
of the High Court of Justice of England, a testatrix, who had
bequeathed all her shares in two specified railway
Will,
Construction, companies, had never owned any shares in either,
Falsa
Demostratio but at the date of her will held debenture stock
of each company, which she continued to hold at the time of
her death; and it was held that the debenture stock passed
under the bequest: In re Weeding, [1896] 2 Ch. 364.
Ardemus Stewart.

